Parties as Disciplinarians: Charisma and Commitment Problems in Programmatic Campaigning

Abstract: We study how parties balance the benefits of disciplined programmatic campaigning with the electoral appeal of charismatic but potentially unfaithful candidates. We incorporate the well-known collective action problem arising from candidates’ inability to fully internalize the fruits of programmatic brand building. Although parties may strategically use promotions to induce brand building efforts, we show that the party may be unable to commit to such a promotion scheme when the electoral returns to candidate charisma are high. We further demonstrate how electoral volatility and parties’ ingroup loyalties shape their commitment to reward brand building. Volatility increases the focus on candidate charisma and decreases programmatic campaigning, but only among parties with weak group attachments. Parties with loyal partisans place emphasis on both candidate charisma and programmatic messaging. Empirical analyses of cross-national data and quantitative and qualitative case studies in Brazil, Austria, and Spain are consistent with our predictions.

verification materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, procedures, and analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/AWSQ7W.

Charisma, understood as a quality of one’s personality that is appealing to others and can inspire loyalty and following toward oneself (Willner and Willner 1965), provides political purchase. Charismatic politicians create strong emotional bonds with voters (Andrews-Lee 2019) that go beyond the support established through persuasion (Dumitrescu, Gidengil, and Stolle 2015), and appear better able than less charismatic politicians to weather criticism and poor performance (Madsen and Snow 1991; Merolla and Zechmeister 2011). It thus seems that office-seeking parties would do well to nominate as many charismatic candidates as they can. The recent personalistic turn in the politics of many countries is suggestive of the electoral value of political charisma.

Yet, charismatic politicians seem also less inclined to toe the party line than their less “inspiring” counterparts. Recent examples can be found across regional, ideological, and institutional contexts. After the 2018 U.S. Congressional elections, media-savvy...
members of “the Squad” defied Democratic Party leadership and often challenged party messaging. In France, the young telegenic economy minister under Socialist president François Hollande, Emmanuel Macron, left the Socialists to form his own party, setting the stage for a historic defeat of the Socialists in the 2017 presidential elections. In Israel, two charismatic members of Benjamin Netanyahu’s staff, Naftali Bennett and Ayelet Shaked, quit the Likud party and reinvigorated the right-wing Jewish Home in the 2013 parliamentary elections, pushing the ruling coalition further to the right.

Charismatic candidates can therefore create a dilemma for parties. Their electoral appeal should help a party be successful. But, to be viable in the longer run, a party usually requires “routinization” and disciplined party organization (Kitschelt et al. 2010). Scholars have long argued that a programmatic brand is an effective, if not the only, form of such routinization. A programmatic platform facilitates the congregation of like-minded members, the articulation of coherent social interests, the effective communication of policy goals to voters, and coordination across different political offices (Kitschelt 2000; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Snyder and Ting 2002).

How can parties balance charisma with programmatic brand-building? Under what conditions do parties rely more on charismatic or loyalist candidates? Does emphasizing candidate charisma always detract from programmatic campaigning, or are there parties that can successfully employ both strategies? We examine these questions in a formal model in which parties decide on nominations of candidates with varying degrees of electoral valence—like charisma—who in turn make campaign strategy choices. Our starting point is a well-known observation that campaigning on a party’s programmatic platform is a public good (Aldrich 1995; Carey and Shugart 1995). Because no single candidate enjoys the full benefits of promoting the party brand, programmatic campaigning creates externalities that can lead to the underprovision of this public good.

Prior scholars have demonstrated that parties can alleviate this collective action problem by making access to senior positions contingent on the provision of collective goods (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 2007). Our first theoretical contribution is to highlight that in attempting to control candidates’ career advancement for purposes of disciplined programmatic campaigning, the party may first need to resolve another strategic problem—credible commitment, which arises when the party’s candidates vary in charisma. For a party to instill programmatic discipline, it must credibly promise to (sometimes) promote duller politicians who toe the party line ahead of their more charismatic, but likely less disciplined, colleagues.

Our second theoretical contribution is to derive novel predictions about the conditions under which such programmatic commitment is possible. We first show that commitment is difficult in politically or economically volatile environments. In such contexts, the short-term cost of not promoting the most electable politicians outweighs the longer term benefit of programmatic brand building, and therefore parties are more inclined to nominate charismatic candidates and less able to extract programmatic effort from its members.

We also show how the interplay between the public goods problem and the commitment problem varies by party type. Stronger ingroup loyalties—as in ethnic or ideologically extreme parties—can lessen the commitment problem by lessening the public goods problem. Because loyal members are intrinsically motivated to contribute to the collective party brand, the party’s need to manipulate their career advancement to ensure party-centric campaigning is lower. However, when strong enough, such group attachments act as a substitute for commitment, freeing the party to promote charismatic candidates without regard for past candidate behavior. This tendency produces a nonobvious interaction between volatility and group loyalties: Greater volatility encourages the nomination of charismatic candidates and diminishes programmatic campaigning among parties with less pronounced group identities (such as centrist parties), but not among parties with strong ingroup loyalties, for which charismatic and programmatic campaigning coexist.

To illustrate how our theory can inform the empirical study of party behavior, we first analyze party strategies in a sample of more than 70 democracies. Consistent with our theory, the data indicate that parties rely on politician charisma more and programmatic messaging less in more volatile contexts, and that these


4We use the terms “valence” and “charisma” interchangeably. Our theory treats charisma as a characteristic of the politician, not as a relational concept as in, for instance, Weber (1978). Our definition encompasses personal attributes of a politician that allow for leader–follower interactions to arise.
patterns depend on the strength of parties’ group attachments. Addressing the limitations of cross-national data, we find similar support for our theory with a quantitative case study of mayoral elections in Brazil that utilizes a regression discontinuity (RD) design and a more fine-grained measure of charisma. Finally, we also illustrate the theoretical predictions with two qualitative case studies presented in Section F of the Supplemental Appendix.

**Related Literature**

The starting point of our model, that a party’s programmatic platform is subject to a collective action problem that could be solved through the control of members’ careers, has been proposed elsewhere. Parties in legislatures use assignments to committee leadership positions (Cox and McCubbins 2007) and devise seniority rules (Shepsle and Nalebuff 1990) or internal norms (Cirone, Cox, and Fiva 2021) to enforce party members’ cooperation in contributing to the collective legislative good. Although we generalize the intraparty dynamics beyond the specific legislative arrangements to a party’s overall campaign strategy, the logic of the public goods problem and the party’s career-centered solution is analogous to these accounts. Our main contribution is to endogenize rather than assume the party’s ability to successfully solve the public goods problem; we do so by highlighting the party’s possible inability to commit to a promotion strategy that sustains its platform.

This commitment problem arises because the party’s candidates vary in valence. Others have also examined the importance of valence for parties’ programmatic strategies. Most of these studies focus on how valence affects, or is affected by, candidates’ and parties’ policy positions in spatial models of party competition (e.g., Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita 2009; Groseclose 2001). Instead, we focus on the weight parties place on valence versus programmatic platforms in campaigns, separately from the particular spatial positions they adopt. One recent study that links valence with a party’s promotion decisions—as we do—is Patty et al. (2019), which considers how parties may use nominations to reveal a politician’s high valence to voters. Among other differences, this model is driven by a party’s need to signal unobserved valence; in our model, valence is fully observable and the strategic tensions arise for other reasons.

The commitment problem in our model may be alleviated by a party internalizing candidate-generated externalities. We borrow this approach to modeling party–candidate interactions from Alesina and Spear (1988). Despite the similar modeling structure, their focus differs from ours. They explore how an inter-generational compensation scheme between younger and older politicians can help moderate a party’s policy position. We study whether reputational uncertainties for parties can act as a credible disciplinary device for prioritizing programmatic campaigning over candidates’ valence. Klašnja and Titiunik (2017) study a related question, exploring whether parties can internalize the electoral costs of incumbent term limits.

Finally, our arguments complement the literature on the impact of formal institutions on parties’ electoral strategies. Electoral rules such as open lists and larger districts disincentivize universalistic programmatic strategies in favor of particularistic strategies such as pork-barrel spending and clientelism (Carey and Shugart 1995; Kitschelt 1995). Provisions for directly elected executives encourage parties to nominate high-valence candidates (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Shugart and Carey 1992). Our focus on how contextual factors—political volatility and group loyalties—interact with intraparty dynamics to shape campaign strategies complements these arguments.

**Model**

We model the interlocking public goods and commitment problems through an interaction between a single party $P$ and $N$ politicians. Play takes place over infinitely many discrete periods $t \in \{1, 2, \ldots, \infty\}$. $N_L$ candidates are born in each period, thereafter competing in $N_L$ distinct campaigns. Following their first campaign, politicians may be nominated by the party to run for a higher post in the following period. There are $N_{HI} < N_L$ such posts (where $N_L + N_{HI} = N$). Politicians not nominated for higher office after the first period “die,” as do all politicians ending their second period of life. The party, by contrast, is infinitely lived. This overlapping generations (OLG) structure borrows from Alesina and Spear (1988) and relates to general mechanisms discussed in Banks and Sundaram (1998). The party discounts the future according to a discount factor $\delta_P$, politicians according to $\delta_I$.

Politicians vary in valence, which is a function of candidates’ personal characteristics such as charisma or

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5 This feature captures not only contexts with legislative districts, but also elections for local executive or legislative offices, such as governorships, mayorships, and local councils.

6 Higher posts are understood broadly, such as a mayoral office for a local council member.
desirable qualifications (e.g., a business person). It is not a choice variable, and it is common knowledge. We denote politician i’s valence as \( v_i \in [0, \bar{v}] \), where \( \bar{v} > 0 \). In each period, a fraction \( \omega \in (0, 1) \) of newly born politicians has a valence of \( v_i = \bar{v} \) and a fraction \( 1 - \omega \) has a valence of zero. For current purposes, we assume \( \omega N_e < N_f \).\(^7\)

In each period, a candidate must choose whether to exert effort at advancing the party’s platform \( e_{i,t} \in (0, 1) \). We term this “party-centric” effort. She devotes effort \( 1 - e_{i,t} \) toward cultivating particularistic support.

Remark 1 (Particularism vs. Personalism). We conceptualize particularism as a campaigning strategy emphasizing the candidate’s ability to deliver service and club goods to constituents (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984). We view particularism as distinct from personalism, which is a campaign strategy emphasizing the candidate’s valence. In principle, candidates may use high valence to further either a particularistic strategy or a party program. Particularistic linkages need not be personalistic; they can be impersonal and institutionalized (Kitschel 2000). Our notion of particularism is broadly analogous to the “personal vote” in the American politics literature (e.g., Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2000).

Remark 2 (Party-Centered vs. Programmatic Effort). We interpret \( e_{i,t} \) as candidate efforts contributing to the party’s programmatic brand. However, \( e_{i,t} \) might be party-centric effort unrelated to a party’s policy program. The same ambiguity occurs in other work conceptualizing the party brand as a public good (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 2007). Although it is possible for campaigns to be party centric without being programmatic, we contend that programmatic campaigns necessitate party-centric effort, and thus our model is well suited to study this important special case. Credible programmatic promises must receive the support of many candidates; this coordination is best achieved around a set of agreed policy issues—a party line.

Candidates are office-motivated; their electoral success is a function of two components. The first component, comprised of particularistic effort \( (1 - e_{i,t}) \) and valence \( (v_i) \), is specific to a given candidate. The other is a party component, which is increasing in the party-centric effort of all candidates, \( \sum_{j} e_{j,t} \). Hence, in line with others (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 2007), we assume that advancing the party platform may be subject to a public goods problem.

Specifically, we assume that party-centric effort contributes to a candidate’s election probability according to the function \( \lambda G(\sum_{i} e_{i,t}) \), where

\[
G(x) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } x \geq \mu_{i,t} \\
0 & \text{otherwise},
\end{cases}
\]

and \( \mu_{i,t} \sim U[-\frac{1}{2\theta}, \frac{1}{2\theta}] \). Successful party-centric campaigns are thus based on two factors: candidates’ efforts to promote the party platform \( (\sum_{i} e_{i,t}) \) and the vicissitudes of public opinion \((\mu_{i,t})\). This structure shares some similarities with probabilistic voting models ( Dixit and Londregan 1995; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987 ), in which politicians are uncertain of the ideological predilections of the electorate. \( \mu \) is a reduced-form representation of the ex ante uncertainty of voters’ attraction to a party platform. \( \lambda \), in turn, represents the share of voters gained in a successful party-centric campaign, which may be a feature of the average attractiveness of the party, and of the institutions governing elections.

Denoting the cdf of \( \mu \) as \( F(\cdot) \), a candidate can expect a “kick” to her electoral chances of \( \lambda \) with probability \( F(\sum_{i} e_{i,t}) = \psi \sum_{i} e_{i,t} + \frac{1}{2} \). The extent of candidates’ uncertainty is governed by \( \psi \), where high values of \( \psi \) imply a less volatile electorate, and vice versa. We further impose \( \psi \in (0, \frac{1}{2}) \), such that \( F(\cdot) \in [0, 1] \) for all feasible realizations of \( \sum_{i} e_{i,t} \).

We further restrict the range of realizations of \( \lambda \) such that \( \lambda \in (1, 2N) \). \( \lambda < 2N \) ensures that the marginal returns to a candidate from particularistic effort always exceed those of party-centric effort. If \( \lambda \psi > 1 \), however, the number of candidates the party elects in expectation would be maximized if it could induce all candidates to exert party-centric effort. Therefore, for \( \lambda \psi > 1 \) the public goods problem in campaign effort is present.

The probability of election for a candidate \( i \) is \( \gamma x_{i,t} \), where \( x_{i,t} = \lambda F(\sum_{i} e_{i,t}) + 1 - e_{i,t} + v_{i,t} \), where \( \gamma > 0 \) is a scaling parameter ensuring that this expression lies in the unit interval.

In each period, the party chooses which junior candidates to nominate for higher office. Let \( J, |J| = N_j \), index the set of junior candidates, and \( j \in J \) denote a specific junior candidate. \( (K \) denotes a similar indexing for senior candidates.) The party chooses an \( N_f \) dimensional vector \( \mathbf{p} \) where \( p_j \in [0, 1] \) is the probability junior candidate \( j \) is nominated for higher office at \( t + 1 \).

For now, we assume politicians are purely office-seeking. (Below we explore an extension where they also care about their copartisans.) Each candidate receives a utility normalized to one from successfully winning a junior office. Those who are promoted to run for senior office receive a utility \( b > 1 \) if elected. Thus, at the time

\(^7\)The comparative statics are qualitatively unchanged if \( \omega N_e \geq N_f \).
they begin life, each junior candidate has an expected utility function

\[
EU_j(e_{j,t}, e_{j,t+1}; p_j) = \gamma [x_{j,t} + p_j b_{j} x_{j,t+1}],
\]

where \( x_{j,t} = \lambda F \left( \frac{\sum e_{i,t}}{N} \right) + 1 - e_{j,t} + \nu_j \). (1)

The party is also office-seeking. It receives a utility normalized to one for each junior-level post won by its candidates, and a utility \( B > 1 \) for each senior post:

\[
EU_{p,t}(e_{j,t}, e_{k,K,t}) = \gamma \left( \sum_j x_{j,t} + B \sum_k x_{k,t} \right),
\]

where \( x \) is as defined in Equation (1).

The order of play is as follows:

1. All candidates make effort decision \( e_{i,t} \in [0, 1] \).
2. Election outcomes are determined according to the probabilities described above.
3. All politicians in their second period of life “die.” The party sets the nomination schedule \( p \).
4. \( N_H \) junior candidates are nominated for senior office, selected according to \( p \). All junior candidates who are not advanced die. \( N_I \) junior-level candidates are born.
5. Currently living politicians make effort decision.
6. The game repeats.

**Equilibria**

We consider symmetric subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies. A strategy for each politician \( i \) is a mapping from her type \( \nu_i \) and her promotion probability \( p_i \) into her level of effort \( e_i \) : \([0, \nu] \times [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1] \). A strategy for \( P \) consists of a vector of promotion probabilities for each junior politician \( p_j \), which is a mapping from that politician’s effort level \( e_j \) and type \( \nu_j \), \( p_j : [0, \nu] \times [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1] \).

We characterize two classes of equilibria: uncommitted and committed. Commitment entails the party choosing to forgo the promotion of high-valence types; whereas a lack of commitment involves promoting such candidates regardless of their effort allocation (indicated with the notation \( p(e_{j,t} = ., \nu_j = \nu) = 1 \)). We describe only the general features of these equilibria, relegating all technical details and proofs to Sections A and B of the Supplemental Appendix.

Consider first the candidates’ preferences. \( \lambda < 2N \) implies that candidates favor exerting particularistic over party-centric effort. In their final period of life, candidates face no consequences from acting on this primitive preference, and will always do so. Junior candidates, however, face the prospect of nomination for higher office. If the party commits to conditioning nominations on party-centric campaigning, junior candidates may be incentivized to overcome their primitive preference and exert party-centric effort.

However, the party faces a problem: It always strictly prefers to nominate high-valence over low-valence politicians. In an uncommitted equilibrium, the party acts on this preference, always advancing high-valence types regardless of party-centric effort. In turn, charismatic politicians rationally choose to focus on particularistic strategies, never exerting party-centric effort. The party fills the remaining senior candidacies by selecting among the low-valence types at random. The low-valence types also choose to exert particularistic rather than party-centric effort, in line with their primitive preferences. In settings where elections are particularly volatile or party platforms unappealing (low \( \lambda \)), such a low-effort equilibrium is utility-maximizing for the party.

In less politically volatile settings or when \( \lambda \) is higher, the party maximizes its electoral success by inducing some party-centric effort. When the number of high-valence candidates is small relative to the number of senior positions, the party may be able to accomplish this, to a limited extent, even absent commitment. But, in this case, only uncharismatic junior politicians will exert party-centric effort. In this equilibrium, the party advances charismatic candidates with certainty, and induces competition among the low-valence types for posts that remain. For a limited set of parameter values, this equilibrium coexists with that in which party-centric effort is absent for all candidates. We summarize these results in the following proposition.

Proposition 1 (Uncommitted Equilibrium). There always exists an uncommitted equilibrium in which \( P \) elicits no party-centric effort from any candidate, \( e_{i,t} = 0 \) \( \forall i \). If \( \lambda \psi \leq 1 \), this equilibrium is efficient.

If the number of charismatic candidates is sufficiently small relative to senior posts, there coexists an uncommitted equilibrium whereby the party advances all charismatic candidates with certainty. No such types, nor any senior candidates, exert party-centric effort. Among uncharismatic types, the party advances with positive probability only those who exert party-centric effort (\( e_{j,t} = 1 \)). Such candidates are selected for advancement at random. In turn, all uncharismatic types exert party-centric effort.

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8Because the party’s nomination schedule specifies a probability of promotion in the unit interval, we implicitly allow for a form of mixing in the party’s strategy. Strategies are “pure” in that this value is uniquely determined by candidate type and past effort decisions.
The party need not consign itself to this uncommitted equilibrium. To avoid it, however, the party must commit to conditioning the career prospects of all junior politicians—including high-valence ones—on party-centric effort. Of course, this prospect of advancement must be sufficiently attractive to overcome the politicians’ incentive to focus on particularistic campaigning. In Definition A.1 in the Supplemental Appendix, we characterize two thresholds in \( p_j \)—one each for low- and high-valence politicians—such that this incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied. Because the party is, in essence, offering a future reward (the possibility of advancement) in return for present sacrifice (forgoing particularistic campaigning), these constraints grow easier to satisfy as politicians value the future more highly. Lemma A.1 in the Supplemental Appendix defines a minimal discount factor \( \delta_f \) such that these constraints can be simultaneously satisfied: Candidates must be sufficiently forward-looking, \( \delta_f \geq \delta_I \).

This alone is not a sufficient condition for the existence of a committed equilibrium. The party must also overcome its own incentive to favor high-valence candidates. We contend that the party achieves such a commitment through its reputation for requiring discipline among its candidates. Should the party ever deviate from its commitment to reward party-centric campaigning—and to punish particularistic electioneering—candidates will cease to view this commitment as credible. Specifically, they will adopt a Nash reversion strategy, henceforth choosing \( e_{i,t} = 0 \) as described in Proposition 1.

We characterize a threshold in the party’s discount factor \( \delta_P \) that allows it to maintain commitment if \( \delta_P \geq \delta_f \). Because the party’s trade-off involves the sacrifice of charismatic candidates, this value is guaranteed to be interior to the unit interval so long as the electoral returns to valence \( \bar{\psi} \) are not too high.

**Proposition 2 (Committed Equilibrium).** There exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which all junior politicians exert party-centric effort, regardless of type, if \( \delta_P \geq \delta_f \) and \( \delta_f \geq \delta_I \). This equilibrium only exists if the returns to party-centric effort are sufficiently high, that is, if \( \lambda \psi > 1 \). In this equilibrium, \( p(e_{j,t} = 0, \nu_j = \cdot) = 0 \) for all types.

In the committed equilibrium, the party minimally satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint of low-valence candidates and assigns senior candidacies to as many party-serving high-valence candidates as possible. This strategy is sufficient to induce party-centric campaigning from all junior politicians, who would lose out on nominations off the path of play should they deviate from this strategy.

We can now begin to characterize situations in which the committed equilibrium is more or less likely to exist.

**Proposition 3.** The value of \( \delta_P \) is weakly rising in \( \bar{\nu} \).

Because commitment entails the sacrifice of high-valence candidates for office, the higher the returns to valence, the more demanding the sacrifice for the party. If electoral politics is overwhelmingly driven by popularity contests, programmatic commitment will require the party to be very forward-looking \( (\delta_P \text{ must be very high}) \).

**Proposition 4.** The minimum values \( \delta_f \) and \( \delta_P \) needed to sustain a committed equilibrium are both rising in volatility \( (\text{falling in } \psi) \) and falling in the party-line electoral appeal \( (\lambda) \).

The committed equilibrium is less likely in settings with high volatility. In volatile settings, the party platform may prove ineffective even when it is clear and annunciated by all candidates. Hence, politicians have a stronger incentive to focus on their direct, particularistic connections with voters. To overcome this incentive, the party must advance the careers of party-serving politicians with high probability, which means the candidates’ incentive compatibility constraints become more demanding. Therefore, as volatility rises, the party must sacrifice a greater number of charismatic politicians to keep everyone on message, something it will only do if it is highly forward-looking. Similar constraints arise if the “kick” to election probabilities from successfully advancing the party line \( (\lambda) \) is small. For instance, \( \lambda \) may be low if the party lacks prominent offices from which its politicians can signal its policy stances.

**Extension: Group Attachments**

So far, we have assumed that politicians care only for their own chances of electoral success. We now consider a setting in which candidates may also care about the election of their fellow party members, which we call group attachment or loyalty. Our approach is related to the work by Harrington (1992), who also examines the role of group attachments in resolving commitment problems in an OLG framework—with important differences. In Harrington’s model, group attachments (which are modeled as politicians who care about policy even after they leave office) directly allow a lame duck leader to credibly commit to enacting party-centric policies. In contrast, in our model, group attachments impact the party’s commitment problem indirectly, by attenuating the public goods problem faced by candidates. This indi-
rect link implies that, in our model, strong attachments can become a substitute for commitment, because the party can extract programmatic effort even without any credible promises to promote candidates based on effort rather than charisma. In Harrington’s model, group attachments always make commitments more credible, and never act as a substitute mechanism.

The strength of group attachments is likely to vary across parties. For instance, group loyalties may be particularly high within ideologically extreme parties, where the distance from the opposition renders any losses by copartisans particularly costly. Alternatively, stronger loyalties may arise because of ingroup identities or outgroup resentments, as when parties represent interests of particular ethnic or linguistic groups.

Consider a model as described above, with the only difference that the candidates’ utility functions now incorporate a parameter \( \alpha > 0 \) representing the strength of the group attachment. Define a candidate’s utility function as:

\[
EU_j(e_{i,t}, e_{i,t+1}; p_i) = \gamma [x_{i,t} + p_i \delta_i bx_{i,t+1}] + \alpha \gamma \sum_{b \neq i} x_{i,b,t} + \delta_j \sum_{b \neq i} x_{i,b,t+1} \tag{3}
\]

where \( x_{i,t} = \lambda F \left( \frac{\sum e_{i,t}}{N} \right) + 1 - e_{i,t} + v_i \).

We note that \( \alpha \) is a characteristic of the party, and that politicians derive value from the success of their copartisans for each of the two periods of life, regardless of whether they are nominated for higher office. Rather than “dying” if they are not nominated, such candidates receive a personal electoral utility of zero and no longer have any choice to make. But they continue to receive utility through their attachment to the party.

We again characterize subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies, which contain an important difference with respect to the baseline model. In this new model, the uncommitted and committed equilibria akin to those in Propositions 1 and 2 exist only if \( \alpha \) is sufficiently small: \( \alpha < \bar{\alpha} \) (see Definition B.5 in the Supplemental Appendix). Contrastingly, for parties with strong group loyalties (\( \alpha \geq \bar{\alpha} \)), the previous two equilibria are replaced by a new loyal equilibrium.

**Proposition 5 (Loyal Equilibrium).** If \( \alpha \geq \bar{\alpha} \), there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which all junior candidates exert party-centric effort (\( e_{j,t} = 1, \ \forall j \)). The party advances high-valence types to senior candidacies with certainty, and selects among low-valence types at random to fill any remaining posts. If group attachment is very high (\( \alpha \geq \beta \bar{\alpha} \)), all senior candidates also exert party-centric effort (\( e_{k,t} = 1, \ \forall k \)). Otherwise (\( \bar{\alpha} < \alpha < \beta \bar{\alpha} \)), all senior candidates exert particularistic effort.

When \( \alpha > \bar{\alpha} \), junior politicians’ public goods problem disappears entirely, and their unique best response is to exert party-centric effort. In turn, the party is free to promote based solely on valence. Thus, when attachments are strong, the committed equilibrium vanishes not because the party is unable to commit, but because it has no incentive to do so. In a sense, this is the best of both worlds for the party: It gains the benefits of programmatic commitment without needing to sacrifice the advancement of high-valence candidates. This is not to say that parties with strong group attachments always win elections; such parties may face limits on their electoral prospects for reasons not captured by the model. Rather, everything else equal, a party with strong group attachments is electorally more successful than it would have been in a counterfactual scenario where it could not have simultaneously campaigned programatically and nominated high-valence candidates.

When \( \alpha < \bar{\alpha} \), the model produces results similar to the baseline model: A committed equilibrium identical to that in Proposition 2 coexists with the uncommitted equilibria for a subset of values of \( \delta_P, \delta_I \).

**Empirical Implications**

To guide the empirical illustration of our model, we outline our empirical expectations in Corollaries 1 and 2, which pertain to the baseline and extended models, respectively. We focus on two relevant outcomes: total programmatic effort, \( \sum_i e_{i,t} \), and the probability with which a high-valence type is promoted.

**Corollary 1 (Baseline Model).** Total party-centric effort in each period, \( \sum_i e_{i,t} \), is strictly greater in the committed than in the uncommitted equilibrium. The probability with which a high-valence type is promoted is weakly greater in the uncommitted than the committed equilibrium.

Proposition 4 says that the thresholds defining the committed equilibrium grow more demanding as volatility increases (\( \psi \) falls). Therefore, Corollary 1 implies that volatility should be negatively correlated with party programmaticness. Similar predictions hold for the value of the party label, \( \lambda \): as this parameter falls, commitment grows more difficult to maintain (Proposition 4).
These implications, however, are common to models that view programmatic politics as subject to a collective action problem. Similar predictions would arise even if the party did not face any constraint on its ability to commit, albeit the public goods problem would be easier for the party to solve.

The predictions unique to our model pertain to the party’s ability to commit, captured by the probability with which charismatic candidates are advanced for senior office. Corollary 1 indicates that volatility should be positively associated with a party’s focus on charisma in nominations. Moreover, positive shocks to the value of the party label \( \lambda \) should be associated with a diminished focus on charisma in candidates’ career advancement.

These claims derive from a comparison across equilibria. Volatility also affects the probability with which charismatic politicians are advanced within the committed equilibrium. Figure 1 presents the full relationship between a focus on charisma (the \( y \)-axis) and volatility (lower values of \( \psi \) on the \( x \)-axis). The dotted line depicts the threshold between equilibria. For empirical purposes, we focus on the cross-equilibrium comparison, which is more practical given the limitations of our data.

Although, to our knowledge, our formally derived predictions on the relationship between volatility and charisma are novel in the literature on political parties, some similar predictions might arise—for different reasons—from the literature on political behavior. Some political sociologists suggest that citizens demand charismatic leadership during times of crisis (Madsen and Snow 1991; Weber 1978) because individuals seek reassurance when faced with psychological stressors by attaching themselves to charismatic personalities (Hart 2019). If psychologically threatening crises are correlated with electoral volatility, these theories would predict that the electoral returns to charisma would also rise with volatility. In our model, this would entail an
increase in \( \bar{\nu} \), which would also hinder party commitment (Proposition 3).

In contrast to our predictions, however, these theories also contend that a crisis renders voters more open to ideological appeals—often to more extreme appeals (Hart 2019; Madsen and Snow 1991). Where our model anticipates that programmatic and charismatic appeals are strategic substitutes, these arguments contend they are complements. As outlined in the corollary below, our model predicts that the behavior of the most ideologically extreme parties should be invariant in volatility.

**Corollary 2 (Extended Model).** Consider two values of \( \psi, \psi' \) and \( \psi'' \), where \( \psi' < \psi'' \). Denote \( \bar{\alpha}(\psi) \) as the value of the threshold in \( \alpha \) for any given realization of \( \psi \).

For parties with strong group attachments (\( \alpha \geq \bar{\alpha}(\psi') \)), an increase in stability (reduction in volatility) from \( \psi' \) to \( \psi'' \) has no effect on total party-centric effort. For parties with weaker attachments, such a shift weakly increases party-centric effort. For parties with strong group attachments, the probability that high-valence types are advanced is fixed and equal to 1 for both realizations of \( \psi \).

Corollary 2, which follows from Proposition 5 and Propositions B.6 and B.7 in the Supplemental Appendix, serves as the basis for our extended empirical analysis. The associations described in our baseline scenario (Corollary 1) between volatility and programmaticness (negative), and volatility and charisma (positive), should diminish—or altogether disappear—for parties with intense group attachments, and exist primarily for parties with weaker attachments.

Irrespective of volatility, parties with strong loyalties rely as heavily on charisma in advancement decisions as uncommitted parties, yet extract from candidates at least as much programmatic effort as do committed parties. These interactive effects are also, to our knowledge, unique to our model. They arise because when attachments are sufficiently strong, they act as a substitute for the credible manipulation of candidates' career concerns. Although Harrington (1992) posits that loyalties to the party resolve intraparty tensions, it does not predict this substitution effect.

Figure 2 depicts the portions of the \( \alpha, \delta_p \) parameter space occupied by the three different equilibria in a stable system (high-\( \psi \), to the right) and a volatile system (low-\( \psi \), to the left). An increase in volatility expands the proportion of the parameter space occupied by the uncommitted equilibrium. But, this effect appears on the left-most portion of the graph—high-\( \alpha \) parties, on the extreme right of the graph, remain in the same equilibrium for both values of \( \psi \).

Although in the next section we focus our empirical analyses on tests of Corollaries 1 and 2, we note that our model gives rise to a number of additional empirical implications. For instance, as is common in OLG models, agents grow more difficult for principals to control as they reach the end of “life.” In our model, this implies that senior politicians will tend to devote more effort to particularistic, and less to party-centric, campaigning.
than their junior counterparts. However, in contrast to most OLG models, Proposition 5 contends that this tendency should disappear when party attachments are strong \((\alpha > b_{\alpha})\). One may also derive predictions regarding party and candidate myopia. Programmatic campaigning should be more common and candidate charisma deemphasized in career advancement when parties and politicians grow more forward-looking—but, only if party attachments are relatively weak. The model further makes predictions with regard to the value of senior office. As senior posts grow relatively more attractive to candidates—perhaps because of better pay or more policy influence—commitment becomes easier for the party to maintain. However, as the value of such posts to the party rises—such as when partisan control of high institutions is on a knife’s edge—commitment grows increasingly difficult because the cost is the sacrifice of electorally viable candidates. We leave empirical analyses of these additional predictions to future work.

**Empirical Illustration**

We now illustrate how our theoretical framework can inform the empirical study of party strategies. We present two analyses: a cross-national survey analysis for a large number of countries and a quantitative case study of Brazilian elections. In the Supplemental Appendix, we present several robustness checks (Section D and E) and two qualitative case studies (Section F) that illustrate the changing strategies of the Austrian People’s Party (as a case of moving from a committed to an uncommitted equilibrium) and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (as a case of moving from a loyal to a committed equilibrium).

**Cross-National Analysis**

**Outcomes.** Corollaries 1 and 2 focus on two outcomes: party-level programmatic effort and the probability with which a high-valence type is promoted. We operationalize these outcomes with data from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP, Kitschelt 2013), an expert survey conducted in 2009 containing information on campaign platforms, policy positions, and party organization in more than 80 countries with multiparty elections.\(^ {10} \)

To operationalize programmatic effort, we create the variable *Programmaticness* as the average of two survey items capturing the degree to which parties emphasize policy positions in campaigning, and how much parties draw on and appeal to voters’ partisan identification.\(^ {11} \)

To operationalize a party’s emphasis in nominations on valence, we create the variable *Personalism* based on the survey item capturing a party’s focus in campaigning on the leader’s charismatic personality.\(^ {12} \) We note that the *Personalism* measure is somewhat removed from our outcome of interest, because it refers to the party leader’s charisma rather than the charisma of the candidates. We address this shortcoming in the quantitative case study of Brazil.

**Key Predictors.** We correlate the *Personalism* and *Programmaticness* outcomes with measures of volatility \( (\frac{\psi}{\alpha}) \) and group attachments \((\alpha)\).

To operationalize volatility, we use the classic Pedersen Index (Pedersen 1979)—the average change in the percentage of party vote shares in a pair of elections (data sources are listed in Table C1 in the Supplemental Appendix). We calculate Volatility for each country as the average Pedersen Index over the four election pairs (or as many as are available) before 2009, the year the DALP variables were generated.

To operationalize party group attachments, we create two measures. The first relies on the item in DALP capturing whether parties have linkages with linguistic or ethnic organizations. Ethnolinguistic cleavages can powerfully structure party strategies (Chandra 2006).\(^ {13} \)

Our second measure of group attachments is ideological extremism. In the standard spatial model, a member of an ideologically moderate party should, on average, receive less disutility from the election of another party’s candidate than a member of an extremist party.\(^ {14} \) Using a DALP item that positions parties on a 10-point left-right scale, we calculate the absolute distance of each party’s placement from the ideological center (the average placement of all the parties); unlike

\(^ {10} \) Due to missing data, our analysis includes fewer countries. See Figure C1 in the Supplemental Appendix.

\(^ {11} \) All the relevant survey items are reproduced in Section C of the Supplemental Appendix.

\(^ {12} \) This question, and those used for *Programmaticness*, is on a 4-point scale, 1 denoting that a party does “not at all” rely on an electoral strategy, and 4 denoting that a party “very strongly” relies on it.

\(^ {13} \) We code as ethnic those parties where the majority of experts indicate ethnic or linguistic ties.

\(^ {14} \) Snyder and Ting (2002) argue that internally weak parties may seek out extreme positions, for reasons exogenous to those considered here.
the ethnic group attachment measure, which is binary, the extremism measure is continuous (ranging from 0 to approximately 6). The categorization of parties and countries in our data based on these key predictors is shown in Supplemental Appendix B.

Given these operationalizations, we translate our corollaries into three testable hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 1**: (From Corollary 1). Higher electoral volatility (corresponding to lower $\psi$) is associated with greater Personalism and lower Programmaticness.

**Hypothesis 2**: (From Corollaries 1 and 2). Higher electoral volatility is associated with greater Personalism and lower Programmaticness, but only among nonethnic and ideologically moderate parties. Ethnic and ideologically extreme parties’ campaign strategies are invariant to electoral volatility.

**Hypothesis 3**: (From Corollaries 1 and 2). When volatility is low, Personalism is higher among ethnic and ideologically extreme parties than, respectively, nonethnic and moderate parties. When electoral volatility is high, Programmaticness is higher among ethnic and ideologically extreme parties than, respectively, nonethnic and ideologically moderate parties.

We first present the unadjusted correlations in the data. Figure 3 reports the raw party-level values (dots) and the linear fit (red line) for Personalism (left plot $y$-axis), and Programmaticness (right plot $y$-axis), against electoral volatility ($x$-axis). These correlations are broadly consistent with Hypothesis 1: Personalism is rising, and Programmaticness decreasing, with electoral volatility.

Figures 4 and 5 similarly show that the raw correlations are broadly in line with the expectations laid out in Hypothesis 2. The top panel suggests a positive association between Personalism and volatility among nonethnic parties (left plot), but less so among ethnic parties. The bottom panel suggests that Programmaticness decreases with volatility for nonethnic parties (left plot), but not for ethnic ones. Similar patterns are found for ideologically moderate and extreme parties (Figure 5).

We further conduct parametric analyses. To examine Hypothesis 1, we fit the following linear regression model with ordinary least squares (OLS):

$$\text{Outcome}_{i,p} = \mu + \beta \text{Volatility}_i + \mathbf{X}_{i,p}\gamma + \mathbf{Z}_i\theta + u_{i,p}, \quad (4)$$

for country $i$ and party $p$. $\mathbf{X}_{i,p}$ contains the party-level covariates, $\mathbf{Z}_i$ the country-level covariates.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^{15}\)Results are unchanged when using two- or three-dimensional measures instead—see Section D of the Supplemental Appendix.

\(^{16}\)We also construct an index of group attachments incorporating ties to labor unions, which produces similar results—see Section D of the Supplemental Appendix.

\(^{17}\)Standard errors are clustered by country.
To examine Hypotheses 2 and 3, we add a group attachment measure and its interaction with volatility:

\[
\text{Outcome}_{i,p} = \mu + \beta_1 \text{Volatility}_i + \beta_2 \text{Group Attachments}_{i,p} + \beta_3 \text{Volatility}_i \times \text{Group Attachments}_{i,p} + X_{i,p} \gamma + Z \theta + \tilde{u}_{i,p}.
\]

This cross-sectional design captures only correlations and not necessarily causal relationships. Still, to isolate as best as possible these associations based on our theory-driven expectations, we include several party- and country-level covariates whose importance has been indicated by previous studies. At the party level, we include party size, and links to unions, businesses, and religious organizations; at the country level, we include differences in electoral systems (plurality vs. PR vs. mixed), ballot rules (open vs. closed vs. mixed),
average district magnitude,\textsuperscript{18} degree of political openness, length of democracy, separation of power rules, economic development, inequality, and ethnolinguistic cleavages. Details on the variables, data sources, and omitted categories are given in Table C2, and summary statistics in Table C3 in the Supplemental Appendix.

\textsuperscript{18}Results are similar when accounting for more detailed institutional rules (Section D in the Supplemental Appendix).

To conserve space, we show useful configurations of predicted values, leaving the presentation of the coefficient estimates for the Supplemental Appendix (Table D1). In the upper panel of Table 1, we compare the predicted \textit{Personalism} and \textit{Programmaticness} (on the 1–4 scale) between a low-volatility (at the 25th percentile in the sample) and high-volatility party system (at the 75th percentile). In the rest of the table, we make the same comparisons separately for a party with strong and weak...
Table 1  Electoral Volatility, Group Attachments, and Electoral Strategies

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Programmaticness</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Volatility</td>
<td></td>
<td>Volatility</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>0.30**</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonethnic party</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>0.35**</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic party</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>0.31*</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate party</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>0.53**</td>
<td>3.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremist party</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>−0.33†</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
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Note: Standard errors are clustered by country. The analyses are based on 431 observations from 75 countries. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1.

group attachments, measured by ethnicity in the middle panel, and by ideological extremism in the lower panel. An ideologically moderate party is at a country’s average left-right party placement (i.e., an ideological distance of zero); the extremist party has the absolute distance from a country’s mean of 3 on the 0–6 scale (approximately the 75th percentile).

The results in the top panel of Table 1 are consistent with Hypothesis 1. For example, parties score on average higher on Personalism by about 0.3 on a 1-4 scale in highly volatile compared to less volatile contexts (significant at p < 0.01).

The results in the middle and lower panels in Table 1 are consistent with Hypothesis 2: Ethnic and ideologically extremist parties’ strategies do not vary substantially with volatility, whereas the strategies of parties with weaker attachments do.

Hypothesis 3 predicts that in stable party systems, Personalism should be higher among ethnic or extremist parties; by contrast, in highly volatile systems, it is Programmaticness that should be higher among these parties compared to parties with weaker group attachments. Estimates in the bottom row of the middle and lower panels in Table 1 show the differences for each party type and each level of volatility. The signs of all four relevant comparisons (in columns 1 and 5 in the middle and bottom panels) are in line with the expectations; three of the four estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels.

The results are thus consistent with all three hypotheses. An important concern, however, is that electoral volatility may be endogenous to past party strategies, particularly candidates’ charisma. For robustness, we check our results with an alternative measure of volatility, commodity terms of trade, which captures a country’s gains and losses from changes in global commodity prices—changes more plausibly exogenous to party strategies as countries are mostly price-takers in the international commodity market. Yet, such economic changes influence overall volatility, and in turn party strategies. The substantive takeaways with this alternative volatility measure are very similar—results are presented in Table D6 in the Supplemental Appendix.
Quantitative Case Study in Brazil

We now present evidence based on Brazil’s mayoral elections between 1996 and 2012, utilizing an RD design. This analysis addresses two limitations of the cross-national analysis: It is based exclusively on candidate-level rather than party leader–level proxies for charisma (as in the DALP data), and it more plausibly allows for the evaluation of causal (albeit local) effects.

Our RD design examines the effect of a party’s mayoral victory on its probability of nominating a charismatic candidate in the following mayoral election. The party’s margin of victory—party’s vote share minus the vote share of its strongest opponent—defines the treatment group as those municipalities where the party wins (positive margin) and the control municipalities where the party loses. Informally, the strength of the design lies in comparing municipalities with close elections. Assuming that parties cannot perfectly control their vote share, municipalities where a party barely wins should be on average similar to municipalities where it barely loses—except for mayoral control. For an introduction to the formal RD assumptions and methodology, see Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik (2020). We reanalyze the data used by Klašnja and Titiunik (2017), who have shown falsification tests that support the RD assumptions, and that a large share of Brazil’s mayoral elections are highly competitive, increasing the relevance of the RD analyses.

How does winning or losing an election relate to our model’s predictions? We contend that an electoral loss is, among other things, a negative shock to a party’s ability to cultivate its programmatic brand, captured in our model by $\lambda$. A winning party sets and implements policy, which directly reflects on its brand. A party out of office cannot do the same, it can only rely on its past (and unsuccessful) campaign promises to maintain its brand (at least until the next election). Also, indirectly, a loss may lead a party’s candidates to downgrade their beliefs about the electoral appeal of the party brand. As shown in Proposition 4 and discussed in relation to Corollary 1, a drop in $\lambda$ means that commitment is harder to sustain ($\bar{\delta}_I$ and $\bar{\delta}_P$ rise), inducing the party to promote more charismatic candidates. This leads to the following hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 4**: (From Corollary 1). An electoral win (corresponding to higher $\lambda$) leads to a lower probability of nominating a charismatic candidate.

For Brazilian mayoral elections to serve as a useful test of our theory, mayorships must be senior posts sought after by junior candidates. There are strong reasons to think this is the case. As part of its democratic...
transition in the 1980s, Brazil started a process of political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization that gave states and municipalities considerable power and autonomy, including over important domains such as education and health care (Falleti 2010). This decentralization cemented the center of political power at the subnational level.

In this context, Brazilian politicians see subnational executive positions as the most valuable prize (Samuels 2003). With only 26 states, the chances of reaching a state governorship are slim; in contrast, the more than 5,500 municipalities provide many opportunities to access the state’s power structure. In fact, even national legislators desire mayoral positions—for example, almost one in five members of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies ran for mayor in 1996 (Leoni, Pereira, and Renno 2004). Moreover, our own analysis of mayors’ career paths for 1996–2012 shows that very few mayors (just 6%) ever embark on careers beyond the municipal level, indicating that the mayor’s office is a final destination (see Table E1 in the Supplemental Appendix for more details). The mayorship is also vastly superior to the other municipal option, the local council, which is considered politically weak (Samuels 2003, p. 22). Consistent with this characterization, in Table E2 in the Supplemental Appendix, we show that mayoral candidates raise on average around 40 times the amount of campaign funds raised by the average local council candidate. In sum, subnational executive offices are one of Brazil’s most valuable political prizes; and among those politicians who compete in municipal-level politics, the office of the mayor is the top aspiration.

The next challenge of our analysis is to measure valence with commonly available information. We start with a proxy denoting whether a candidate is younger than 35 (10th percentile of candidates’ age) the first time they run for mayor. Such young candidates are off to a precocious political career, plausibly fueled in part by charisma and talent. Also, youthful candidates have had less time to rise through the party based solely on the past party-centric efforts.

But youthfulness is not synonymous with valence. Young candidates may, for example, disproportionately owe their candidacies to dynastic ties. We thus construct another proxy indicating whether a candidate is both younger than 35 and an outsider the first time they run, defined as being neither an elected official nor a government employee of any kind. Young candidates with no government experience should have fewer political connections and thus on average be more likely of higher valence.19

For an informal graphical illustration, Figure 6 shows for our two valence measures (the “young” measure in the left and the “young/outsider” measure in the right panel) the binned means against the incumbent party’s margin of victory and a second-order polynomial fit.20 Despite considerable variability in the data, the proportion of higher valence candidates in both panels appears to drop at the cutoff. These patterns are in line with our expectations.

Table 2 more formally evaluates the RD effects. Estimated with a local linear polynomial and mean-squared-error (MSE) optimal bandwidth, we find a decrease of approximately 8 percentage points for the young measure (with a robust21 95% confidence interval between −0.185 and −0.005 for separate main and bias bandwidths, though between −0.172 and 0.043 for bias bandwidth equal to the main bandwidth), and similarly about 9 percentage points for the young/outsider measure (with the robust 95% CI between −0.185 and −0.02 for separate bandwidths, and between −0.194 and −0.001 for equal bandwidths). Although the statistical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>( \tau^{RD} )</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>( h )</th>
<th>( b )</th>
<th>( N_+ )</th>
<th>( N_- )</th>
<th>95% CI (h = b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>−0.084</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>[−0.185, −0.005]</td>
<td>13.491</td>
<td>24.643</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>[−0.172, 0.043]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young and outsider</td>
<td>−0.092</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>[−0.185, −0.020]</td>
<td>12.280</td>
<td>22.333</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>[−0.194, −0.001]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Results from local linear polynomial estimation and robust inference. \( \tau^{RD} \) is the conventional RD effect, \( h \) the MSE-optimal main bandwidth, \( b \) the MSE-optimal bias bandwidth; \( N_+ \) and \( N_- \) are, respectively, sample sizes within the main bandwidth to the right and left of the cutoff. The fourth column shows the robust bias-corrected 95% confidence interval. The last column reports the robust bias-corrected 95% CI when the bias bandwidth is equal to the main bandwidth. Results implemented with \texttt{rdrobust} (Calonico et al. 2017).

19Because these measures are imperfect, we perform a validation analysis inspired by Erikson and Palfrey (1998) and using machine learning methods. Details are provided in Section E of the Supplemental Appendix.

20Brazil’s mayors can serve two consecutive terms. We focus on elections where winning candidates are not term-limited in the subsequent election, to avoid the possible mechanical age effects. For more details, see Section E in the Supplemental Appendix.

21For details on robust RD inference see Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titunik (2014).
significance of the effect on the young outcome is sensitive to the bias bandwidth, the results appear generally consistent with our theoretical expectations and complement the evidence from our cross-national analysis.

**Conclusion**

We have provided a framework to examine how parties balance the emphasis on charisma versus programmatic platforms in campaigns, envisioning this choice as a product of two strategic dilemmas parties face in interactions with their candidates. Our theory first draws on the well-known idea that the creation of a party’s programmatic platform entails externalities that cannot be fully internalized by a single candidate. To this collective action problem, our framework adds the commitment problem that the party may face in enforcing programmatic discipline when some of its candidates are highly charismatic.

Our model also contributes new insights about the conditions that affect the party’s ability to solve these collective action and commitment problems. Electoral or economic volatility diminishes the party’s credible commitment to programmatic campaigning, leading to a greater emphasis on candidate charisma in promotion decisions. Strong ingroup loyalties can help solve the collective action problem, but may also obviate the need for a party to use promotions to instill programmatic discipline, inducing it to emphasize candidates’ charisma yet again. Such tendencies produce an interaction between volatility and the (lack of) strength of group attachments in structuring parties’ strategies.

Our framework could be extended to formally microfound the intraparty implications of well-known arguments linking party strategies with institutional rules. For example, Samuels and Shugart (2010) argue that compared to parliamentary systems, presidential systems tend to produce ideologically more diffuse parties that are less likely to nominate party insiders for executive office. This, they argue, is because presidential candidates must have broader electoral appeal when competing in national elections. Our model suggests how such incentives would intensify the parties’ commitment problems in presidential systems, producing both ideologically vague platforms and nominations of charismatic outsiders. We believe a fruitful avenue for future research is the development of a closer theoretical integration between extraparty institutions and intraparty strategic interactions.

**References**


**Supporting Information**

Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of the article.

**Appendix A:** Proofs of Theoretical Propositions: Baseline Model

**Appendix B:** Proofs of Theoretical Propositions: Extended Model

**Appendix C:** Empirical Analysis: Cross-National Data Sources and Variables

**Appendix D:** Empirical Analysis: Additional Cross-National Results

**Appendix E:** Empirical Analysis: Additional Results for the Quantitative Case Study

**Appendix F:** Qualitative Case Studies